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Abstract: Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are often deployed in hostile environments, where an
adversary can physically capture some of the sensor nodes. The adversary collects all the nodes’
important credentials and subsequently replicate the nodes, which may expose the network to a number
of other security attacks, and eventually compromise the entire network. This harmful attack where
a single or more nodes illegitimately claims an identity as replicas is known as the node replication
attack. The problem of node replication attack can be further aggravated due to the mobile nature in
WSN. In this paper, we propose an extended version of multi-level replica detection technique built
on Danger Theory (DT), which utilizes a hybrid approach (centralized and distributed) to shield the
mobile wireless sensor networks (MWSNs) from clone attacks. The danger theory concept depends on a
multi-level of detections; first stage (highlights the danger zone (DZ) by checking the abnormal behavior
of mobile nodes), second stage (battery check and random number) and third stage (inform about replica
to other networks). The DT method performance is highlighted through security parameters such as
false negative, energy, detection time, communication overhead and delay in detection. The proposed
approach also demonstrates that the hybrid DT method is capable and successful in detecting and
mitigating any malicious activities initiated by the replica. Nowadays, crimes are vastly increasing and
it is crucial to modify the systems accordingly. Indeed, it is understood that the communication needs to
be secured by keen observation at each level of detection. The simulation results show that the proposed
approach overcomes the weaknesses of the previous and existing centralized and distributed approaches
and enhances the performance of MWSN in terms of communication and memory overhead.
Keywords: mobile wireless sensor network; hybrid; node replication attack; danger theory; danger
zone; wireless sensor network
1. Introduction
Currently, the major focus of research has been on mobile wireless sensor networks (MWSNs), as an
advantage of mobile nodes that control the movement by itself. Further, it has been noticed that mobility
reduces the problems regarding maximum coverage area and connectivity. However, in MWSNs, the most
important task is the position estimation of mobile nodes. Recently, many applications for execution
mobility perform an important role in a specific type of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), which are
known as MWSNs. Currently, MWSN has become the main focus of research as it has many issues
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regarding connectivity, coverage area and energy consumption. Recent research has shown that the
features of mobility reduce many problems instead of making them complex. Nowadays, MWSNs are
used in many applications like monitoring, tracking and sensing in different environments. Therefore,
mobile nodes are important and necessary modules in a wide range of applications of sensor networks [1].
Typically, the wireless sensor nodes are unattended that contains mobile nodes with low cost features.
Mobile nodes are comprised of multiple components, including mobility, memory, power, micro-controller,
sensing capabilities and communication features. Nowadays, there are numerous types of security attacks
identical to wormhole, clone attacks, DoS, cyber security, routing, Sybil, jamming, privacy factor, physical,
black hole and others. A clone node attack is a perilous one in MWSN. An advisory can grab the mobile
node in order to capture the information stored in it and later on can generate manifold clones of the
captured mobile node. Thus, a clone attack eventually depends on how briskly a malicious activity can
initiate in the network. An advisory conquers the cons of the unattended nature of compromised node
and attains the whole data from its memory such as its key, identity, communicating information and
so on. Additionally, an advisory can imitate the captured mobile node and deploy it again back to the
network in the target destination. Afterwards, this compromise mobile node can be used by the advisory
to monitor and control the multiple features. Therefore, it can be very harmful if the clone node is not
detected on time.
In this paper, our major concern is to explore the concept of Danger Theory (DT) for clone node
detection. In the primary work [2], we recruited the solution of clone detection which relies upon two
methods, specifically, attack detection and security control with respect to the true positive, false negative
and false positive rate. A motivation of the proposed enhanced version of the DT method supports the
identification of a clone in a secure manner. The multi-steps detection approach is comprised of three
stages of recognition; first step (based upon clustering method), second step (correlation of the battery
level and random numbers) and third (secure network). For detecting the existence of malicious nodes,
the proposed DT method implements the concept of clone detection with multiple stages. The extended
version is proposed in this paper to secure the communication from duplicate nodes with addition to
password protection. It is crucial to effectively secure the nodes’ credentials in terms of communication
overhead, frequency, energy, detection rate, life time, delay and false negative. In this paper, the advanced
experiments are originated to sort out the weaknesses of previous works [2]. With merging the idea of
password protection approach, the security experimental results achieved are more accurate and precise.
Furthermore, we have provided the comparison of the proposed method to other existing methods. We
observed interesting differences between the DT approach and existing methods, whereby each level
shows a unique and efficient analysis of clone detection. Therefore, in this paper, the significances of
both methods’ voltage comparison and password protection are executed and evaluated.
The rest of the proposed paper is classified as follows. Section 2 briefly elaborates the existing
methods for detecting clone mobile nodes. Section 3 highlights the secure DT based work in terms of
network and threat model in MWSN. In addition, it also discusses about the multi-steps DT approach
more briefly with different features. Section 4 focuses on the process of the clone detection, precisely
the first step (clustering), second step (correlation of the battery level and random numbers) and third
step (network security) which are demonstrated and described in detail. The performance evaluation
and discussion of the outcomes are simulated in Sections 5 and 6, respectively, and the proposed
method is concluded in Section 7.
2. Existing Replica Detection Methods
In MWSN, mobile nodes are performing important functions and multi orientated tasks in
various applications. Moreover, it is comprised of numerous factors and can take additional benefits
as compared to static node [3]. Existing approaches for detection and mitigation clone threats are
categorized in two categories, which are distributed and centralized.
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2.1. Centralized Methods
This method depends on the speed of legitimate nodes which must be less than the network
speed, and the clone will travel much quicker than the network maximum speed. Hence, the mobile
node speed limit must be checked and compared. If a speed limit increases the network speed, at that
moment there can be a chance that the mobile nodes of the same identity are existing [4,5]. In [6],
a novel protocol for the recognition of clone threat elaborated. This theory is created on the concept of
Polynomial-based pair-wise key pre-distribution and Bloom Filters, which explained that the clone
node cannot deploy into real presence and pair wise keys of each mobile node in MWSN. Hence,
replicas can be known by computing the predefined value, and is identified when it goes beyond the
settled value.
2.2. Distributed Methods
The Efficient and Distributed Detection (EDD) and Storage Efficient and Distributed Detection
(SEDD) [7] rely on factors such as the times interval, whereby when one node encounters another
mobile node, it must be less than the mentioned interval. The EDD method relies on two stages, namely
online and offline. The first step is simulated earlier to deployment and another step is initiated on per
move of every node in MWSN. The SEED method tackles the overhead storage in MWSN and gives
the solution of time interval of EDD. Hence, each node only screens the subset rather than the whole
in precise time interval. Two scenarios have been elaborated by Patrol detection [8], namely, static and
mobile nodes for clone attacks. It depends on the perception that there is a chance of clone mobile node
if two or several nodes have same identity or key at various location. Moreover, speed limit check on
mobile node, if increase the certain limit will be a chance of clone node in MWSN. Onward that mobile
node will access the distance and correlate it with range and later save the information in white and black
lists where black list identified as clone identity. Therefore, if Patroller fluctuates the position, it moves in
different time interval i.e., T, T + Interval. The Single Hop Detection (SHD) [9] method proposed for
clone states that nodes in MWSN at a specific time cannot exist in neighbor node list. The existing method
depends upon the fingerprint verification and claim. Consequently, two mobile nodes interchange the
information i.e., witness node and when two claims with the same identity frequency matches in the
neighbor group, it indicates the existence of a clone. The token exchange depends on the deployed
mobile nodes do not cooperate in clone approach has been proposed in [10]. Therefore, during mobile
node frequency of meeting with other mobile node exchange, the tokens are stored in their memory.
On the next meeting, each node will ask about the last exchanged token and wrong information will
specify as the clone node. Moreover, they also explained that the idea relies on each node’s cooperation,
and same node presence seen multiple times are also known as clone nodes. In [11], the authors proposed
two solutions for clone detection, namely SDD (Simple Distributed Detection) and CDD (Cooperative
Distributed Detection). It relies on the number of observations of node meeting, where it is necessary
to re-meet the other node in a precise time period otherwise the node would be considered as a clone
node. The CDD approach is initiated for more collaboration in clone detection. The UTLSE (Unary
Time Location Storage and Exchange) and MTLSD (Multi Time Location Storage and Diffusion)
clone detection methods have been discussed in [12]. Accordingly, the concept of swapping time
position is claimed in the MWSN communication area of every encountered nodes. In Static WSN,
the authors [13,14] proposed the clone detection solution using cluster based. Localization based
detection approach has been explained in [15].
3. Proposed Security Model
3.1. Network Threat Model
The network model is assumed as homogeneous consisting of N quantity sensor nodes in the
considered DT technique. In the proposed approach, it is assumed that the random way point model
for every single mobile node movement though their position and location would be different with
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neighbor nodes at T time period. In a fixed battery scenario, to perform a competent process such as
sensing data and exchanging information in MWSN, the system needs to replace dead nodes with new
mobile nodes. Moreover, it is considered that every mobile sensing node can be identified through
cluster head via communicating and exchanging data (i.e., battery, key, location, ID) in the form of
packets to each cluster head. A distinctive key and identity will be assigned to every mobile node
earlier to deployment by network administrator and the availability of bidirectional communication
links between mobile nodes is also considered. It is noted that every mobile node is capable to know
its location via localization method [16,17]. The clone threats can occur through advisory actively or
passively. Passive Attacks are those in which an advisory just takes the data of the original mobile
node. Active attacks are capturing and stealing all the data in addition to inserting dangerous attacks
in the network. Clearly, the active attacks are more harmful and malicious. An advisory can generate
numerous clones of the same mobile node. In the proposed method, we suppose that advisory cannot
change the key of the nodes although it has capability of fully controlling mobile nodes. In this scenario,
the attacker can use the captured nodes to perform dangerous situations, as both nodes (original and
clone node) have same features.
3.2. Cluster Assumption
The mobile nodes are generally deployed in clusters [18] where each cluster has a cluster head
(CH) [19]. In MWSNs, the operation of replica detection relies on the performance of cluster head,
as cluster head is responsible to transmit data, communicate with other cluster head and arrange the
information before transmission. Therefore, it is essential to pick a mobile node that has the capability
to achieve the above target [20]. In this paper, the following features are assumed for the deployment
of cluster:
1. The maximum battery level should necessitate for cluster head to accomplish the responsibilities.
2. The high-level connectivity and coverage must have a chosen cluster head in MWSN.
3. To abate the transmission time, the selected cluster head should be placed near the BS (Base Station).
4. The cluster head is fixed over time for the predefined detection period.
Figure 1 shows the clusters in MWSN where they are grouped together in circles with radius R.
Basically, clustering algorithm is mostly used to enhance the network’s life time in MWSN. It carries
out self-organizing and re-clustering operations for cluster head selection in each detection period.
Accordingly, one mobile node performs the tasks of CH and other mobile nodes take action as the
member of the clusters. CH communicates with members of the mobile nodes and sends the collected
information to the BS. It is dependent on two stages: First is the setup stage and second is the steady
state stage. Formation of clustering and CH occurs in the first phase. Mobile nodes elect the cluster
head independently. The chosen CH transmissions the information via Carrier Sense Multiple Access
with Collision Avoidance Medium Access Control (CSMA/CA MAC) protocols [21]. Associate mobile
nodes choose the cluster head (i.e., CH) by computing Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI).
After the CH captures the information and connects to the cluster, the cluster head (i.e., CH) creates
a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) found list for its members and allots a time period slot
for transmission for every node. The second stage is initiated after selecting the cluster and CH in
MWSNs. In steady state, mobile nodes establish connection to CH through allots slots depending
upon the period. Otherwise, mobile nodes lie in sleeping state. Once CH receives information from all
associated mobile nodes, it would start the data transmission towards the BS [22].
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Figure 1. Cluster in MWSN.
4. Danger Theory (DT) Based Approach
The DT idea was introduced by Matzinger [23] and Mark Burgess [24] further explained the danger
theory concept in 1998 in computer systems for protection. We introduce the DT method for clone
detection by involving the multiple stages. Figure 2 demonstrates the various steps to detect and
mitigate the clone process via DT mechanism. The DT approach introduces three levels of the detection
and mitigation process. The first step is to highlight the abnormality of DZ in mobile nodes that is fishy.
This factor for clone detection can be seen in terms of true positive and false positive. The second step
depends upon battery check and random number password, if two mobile nodes are found with the
same ID and different key (battery check) and if an identical ID is found with an identical key (random
number-based check). The third stage is for securing MWSN, the key role is to update all about the
clone node.
Figure 2. Clone Detection Stages in MWSN.
4.1. First Level Detection
If two or more replica mobile nodes with the same ID and features are deployed, it would indicate
the presence of a clone mobile node. The replica mobile node will involve stealing the communication
as an advisory which can lead the information to be misused actively in MWSN. Moreover, he/she
could control and monitor the system. Hence, the cluster-based approach is introduced to monitor
the abnormality in the mobile nodes. Every mobile node exchanges the information to the CH in
the packets form. Each CH monitors the frequency of mobile node meeting (i.e., (λ)), monitor that
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uncertainty if lambda is beyond the set range; it alarms the clone’s existence in MWSN. Furthermore,
the identified cluster known as DZ is established by the mobile node location in a minimum time
period. In Algorithm 1, the frequency of the identical node meeting is achieved through checking the
predefined threshold. The CH will generate a message to BS, to highlight the DZ (Danger Zone) as
illustrated in the algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Cluster Based (First Level Detection)
Input: Check whether the frequency of node meeting (λ) is greater than or equal to the threshold value (ζ).
Output: Identification of replica(s) in MWSN by highlighting the Danger Zone.
Description:
1: Initialize mobile nodes;
2: for (i=0; i ≥ ζ; i ++);
3: Cluster header elect based on LEACH protocol
4: Broadcast the message to all neighbors nodes in cluster transmission range of the cluster head
5: If λ ≥ ζ then;
6: Abnormality in network
7: Broadcast message to BS







4.1.1. Data Exchange between Mobile Nodes
For each precise detection interval, a mobile node at certain time varies its location and interconnects
with the near mobile nodes [25], as shown in Figure 3. Every mobile node when encountering mobile




where IDa, Va, Ka, La, Da, IDb, Vb, Kb, Lb, and Db are the identities, voltages, private keys, locations and
destination IDs of node a and node b respectively. Figure 3 explains the entire sequence i.e., movement
of mobile node, the changing of its position at different time intervals and the exchange of information
based on packets, whereas each packet transfers the information based on the node identity, voltage,
key, location and destination identity [26]. The concept of node information exchange is explained
as follows: Let a, b, c, d, ..., denote the mobile nodes in the MWSN and t = t1, t2, t3, t4, ..., tn, equal
time interval and associate the time interval with the cluster head meeting (i.e., CH). Once the random
mobile node (i.e., a, b, c, ...) meets the CH node, the CH node computes a time t for each node meeting.
Specifically, using k, l, m, n, o, p, q, . . . ..., to explain the time of node meeting, where t1 < t2 < t3 given
k < l < m. Assuming a is a mobile node and it meets CH (cluster head) at time t1, where k < l, CH
meets the mobile node a again at time t7. Thus, CH meets twice with mobile node a at a distinct period,
as shown in the the above figure, and this indicates the similar node IDs (i.e., a) meet with cluster head.
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Figure 3. Mobile node encounter to other node at various time intervals.
4.1.2. Frequency of Mobile Node Meeting
The clone threats can be traced via the frequency that the mobile nodes meet each other. The action
of the mobile nodes are distributed into two groups: (i) Ordinary scenario A (i.e., no clone node) and
(ii) anomalous scenario A∗ (i.e., existence of clone).
Z(t) =
{
Normal (A) if λ < ζ
Abnormal (A∗) if λ ≥ ζ
(1)
where lambda(λ) characterizes the mobile node meeting (i.e., frequency) and random threshold stetted
value represented by Zeta (ζ). The mathematical expression demonstrates that there could be a chance
of the presence of a clone when the stetted threshold is beyond the frequency of the mobile node
meeting. The equation indicates A(i) as the normal situation, while A∗(i) as the abnormality (i.e., clone
mobile node), that comprises the entire ith counters. Consider the detection probability rate in the form






Let λ, for clone detection depend upon mobile node meeting frequency can be expressed as,
λ =
{
λS = P(R = 1|A∗) if IDs with same key
λD = P(R = 0|A∗) if IDs with different key
(3)
where the clone existence conditional probability is either the similar identity with similar private
key is P(R = 1|A∗) and similar identity and different key in MWSNs can be defined as P(R = 0|A∗).
Hence, the replica mobile node can be expressed by:





The number of counters cab is shown by µi while i represents the value from 1 to k. By solving
this expression and extracting the sum of conditional probability by,









(1− P(R = 1|µi) if R = 0 (6)
By computing the above mathematical expression (5) and (6), the clone detection probability can
be calculated as below,




(1− P(R = 1| : µi) (7)




(1− P(R = 1| : µi) (8)
λ ≥ ζ represents the clone node presence in the MWSN, where ζ represents the threshold analyzed
by the network operator.
4.1.3. Setup of DZ (Danger Zone)
In DT approach, the unique concept term DZ is used to identify the clone. Basically, the concept is
to highlight the infected area where an attacker can insert clone mobile nodes. The idea of DZ would
be helpful for fast detection of replication attacks. By using this concept, it can focus only on infected
areas instead of the entire network for replication attacks detection. Consequently, the CH will inform
the network (i.e., BS) about the clone presence in MWSN and afterwards will indicate the affected
cluster by the mean of DZ. Figure 4 explains the ordinary scenario where it later warns about the clone
mobile node presence and, highlights the area of specific cluster by means of danger zone. Supposedly,
the cluster area remains the same before and after deployment, although the mobile nodes are in
motion. Furthermore, if the T detection interval is in MWSN, considering that the motion model for
mobile node is the random way point mobility model, then the possible clone existence in the specific
cluster can be signified as DZ.
Figure 4. Cluster level detection in a Mobile Wireless Sensor Network (MWSN).
4.2. Second Level Detection
The first stage of detection is completed after the highlighted infected area (i.e., DZ) and then the
second stage of detection is initiated. In the proposed DT approach, two scenarios have been raised
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with the solutions: First is based on battery comparison of two nodes and the other is random number
based. In battery comparison, checking the voltage level as the clone mobile node is deployed after the
original. Hence, it should have maximum voltage to capture and monitor the network [27]. Moreover,
replica will prerequisite to have higher levels of battery to control, observe, interconnect and screen
various tasks. In random number method, the CH will enquire the indicated mobile node to exchange
numbers (i.e., password). The right number will confirm the original mobile node, otherwise it would
be located as a clone. Algorithm 2 describes the whole procedure of clone node in detail. This idea has
been raised to increase the detection rate at the first stage of identification but there are also several
chances that the original mobile node encountered CH many times in the same time interval. Therefore,
the second stage detection is indeed important in order to differentiate between the clone and original
mobile node to suppose the statistic that if same identity and same key, other same identity with a
different key. To sort out this problem, two types of strategies have been considered, which are:
1. Battery Check
2. Random Number
Algorithm 2 Battery Check and Random Number (Second Level Detection)
Input: Check the battery or random number of nodes claiming the same ID. In the case of voltage level
comparison, the nodes that have greater voltage would be a replica else performed the task based on
password checking.
Output: Verification of replica in MWSN by voltage comparison or password of same IDs.
Description:
1: If mobile node ID matched with different key;
2: Compare the voltages
3: If Vj > Vi
4: Replicated node
5: Otherwise Original Node
6: Otherwise mobile node ID matched with same key;
7: Ask Password;






In [28], the authors discussed the various categories of batteries frequently utilized in the mobile
nodes, their voltage rate for initial start-up and ending interval. Mobile nodes will encounter the
information based on the mobile node ID, battery level and key during the meeting with CH node
in a precise time limit [29]. The CH will establish a list for specific intervals in memory and will also
build the connection to broadcast the message. Accordingly, the presence of two or multiple mobile
nodes with identical ID directs that the clone node exists in MWSN. This conclusion is derived from
the assumption that to establish, control or screen the entire system, an adversary requires maximum
capacity of voltage and the factor that the clone is deployed after the real node too. Hence, we assume
that the clone has a greater value in contrast to real one. Battery types, for example Zinc Manganese
Dioxide and LeClanche, are not advised to be used in sensor networks because of their lower capacity
and huge charging time as discharging occurs by itself in the storage and it discharges quickly. Some
batteries have low cost specification like Alkaline with a high capacity and low discharging, hence it is
highly suggested in MWSN. It is much difficult to charge a huge number of mobile nodes in MWSN,
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which is why the battery used in the network is not rechargeable. The battery-based comparison is
established by screening the voltages in the network operation. Furthermore, the battery level rapidly
goes down because of discharging abilities and due to rapid change in the discharge rate capacity that
varies as well. The author in [26] explained the method to measure the MICA2 sensor node.
Lemma 1. Comparison based on battery: Consider Bi is a Battery level of a real mobile node which is deployed at
the initial time (i.e., t = 0) and Bj is the battery level of a clone which is deployed after time t in the MWSN (i.e.,
t + t′). Bj is deployed later at time t + t′ while Bi at t = 0, hence Bj has a greater value. Furthermore, to control
and screen the information advisory requires a huge voltage level, else will fail the aim to produce clone. Besides,
if Bi 6= Bj
At t = 0; Bi ≈ Bmax
At t = t + t′; Bi ≈ Bmax − Bconsumed
Bj ≈ Bmax
Bi < Bj
This demonstrates the expression for mobile node deployment with specific time and clone comes
after t + t′ of real mobile node, hence has a maximum battery capacity. With this consideration, it has a
probability of high false positive and low true positive rate. The proposed DT based method is computed
for maximum efficiency in terms of true positive and false positive rate by contrasting the battery level.
4.2.2. Random Number Based
As discussed in the literature review section, the XED (extremely efficient detection) [30] is built
with the logic of exchanging the random numbers at various locations. The approach is based on the
concept of remember and challenge. Accordingly, uncertainty did not encounter the correct number
or the value were not the same (based on random number), which indicates the existence of a clone.
By using this concept in the DT approach, replication attack can be reduced (replica meets the cluster
head again at a different time interval, if frequency of node meeting with similar IDs and same private
key (i.e., λS)) occurrence in MWSNs. The CH transfers the information to the identified node (similar
IDs with similar key features) to encounter random value. It would be a clone mobile if it encounters
false information. If the CH encounters to the mobile node at t time interval λS, r is random number
value and S is IDs of identical mobile node. Accordingly, CH will send the message to the ’S’ (identified
same IDs) to encounter a random number. The check depends upon the binary numbers, if r = n
indicates that the exchange number is wrong, and then the clone mobile node is identified. Conversely,
if r = r, an identified node is the original one. The method to check the value, if the right (i.e.,
r = r → R) is provided, it would be the original node. Otherwise, it will be considered as a replicated
node (i.e., r = n→ W) in MWSN. The password check procedure will only be initiated if the mobile
node has similar IDs with similar keys. Furthermore, memory overhead has been calculated to show
the minimum memory utilization in the proposed DT approach. Therefore, O(1) is the calculated
value of the memory overhead, which permits the count to be constant and independent of the many
mobile nodes meeting in the verification process of the replicated node. The memory is adequate to
collect the data since a precise number of mobile nodes are executing this job. Thus, the CH maintains
the constancy of the number check as it finds identical node identity with identical key by means of
memory cost O(1). A distinct approach to check random number with identical identity mobile node
has the ability to detect replica. This quick detection is the main feature of the proposed method which
distinguishes itself from other existing clone detection approaches.
s =
{
Replicated node if r = n
Original node if r = r
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4.3. Third Level Detection
The third stage will start after the confirmation of the clone mobile node presence. Most of the
existing proposed methods to detect clones are considered the detection of clone rather than securing
the entire system. To sort out this issue, third stage is proposed. So, the CH will transmit the information
about clone mobile node to the BS. The inspiration to initiate the third level detection is to highlight the
mitigation process, as many of the existing approaches only focus on detection instead of prevention of
replication in MWSNs. Figure 5 proves the task of network protection through broadcast information
about clone to other BSs. It should be noted that by broadcasting IDs of clone node, it would be
difficult to differentiate between the clone and the original one. Therefore, it is necessary to transmit the
communication to the entire BSs about clone presence (i.e., specific node Identity). The entire process of
MWSN protection is explained in detail in Algorithm 3, as there is probability that the clone will move
into near clusters and comprise himself another time in dangerous threats. To prevent the replication
attacks, this approach broadcasts the information about clone to another cluster through BS. Thus,
by adopting this approach, the MWSN can be secured from malicious threats vastly.
Figure 5. Secure network by broadcasting message about clone.
Algorithm 3 Network Protection (Third Level Detection)
Input:To inform other BSs about replica through the replica node’s ID and Key.
Output: Protection from replication attacks in MWSN through replica node’s ID and key.
Description:
1: Node Replica;
2: If Broadcast the message to other BS through ID and key.
3: Networks Protected from replica attacks.
4: Return 0;





The simulation design for MWSN is composed of N nodes (i.e., 200 for this simulation), size of
network is 500 m × 500 m, communication area is 3–25 m, randomly deployed, mobility model is
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RWPM, clone varies in range between 10 to 70, Base Station (BS) is (150,195), alkaline battery, time for
is 300 s, clusters number is 3 to 10 depending on the design, bit rate is 9600 bps, speed is 3 m/s, size of
packet is 24 bits.
5.2. Simulation Results: Different Parameters’ Effects on Replication Attack Detection
The DT method evaluates key factors recognized as true positive, false positive and false negative.
The DT based approach involves three major security parameters; true positive, false positive and false
negative. Furthermore, it also shows the impact of other performance parameters such as detection
accuracy, communication overhead, memory overhead, detection rate, energy, effect of lambda, network
life time, detection time, delay impact and comparison of SPRT (centralized approach) and XED
(distributed approach) in detail. The outputs show the average value for 20 simulation runs, and it uses
the average or stabilized value to analyze the replication attacks performance. The parameters used for
detection of clones to evaluate the hybrid process are defined and discussed as follows.
5.2.1. Detection Accuracy
The DT method evaluates key factors recognized as true positive and false positive. The effectively
detected clone is identified as true positive, however, unsuccessfully rate is known as the false positive.
The simulation execution of the proposed danger theory at multiple stage is illustrated in Figure 6.
In the figure, the high accumulation rate of clone identification is at a distinct phase. It can also be
observed that at each stage, the true positive rises. As the proposed method consists of multiple stages
in mean to detect the clones, the first stage is designed for verification, in addition of the identification
of the anomaly at cluster to establish the danger area (i.e., DZ). The second stage is towards mitigating
the clone threat by contrasting the battery level and encountering the random number check while
the third stage is to prevent the MWSN from dangerous attacks by transmitting messages through
BS to others. To categorize the sheltered network from clone attacks, there is a framework analysis to
improve the true positive (i.e., successfully replica detection) and decrease the false positive rate (i.e.,
wrongly detected replicas). Therefore, the proposed DT (multilevel detection) method has an impact
on the development in clones’ threats detection execution.
It can be noticed that the first stage detection screens minor clone detection rate (i.e., in term of
true positive), below 0.6 besides vast false positive rate, higher than 0.5. However, in the second and
third stage, it validates the equivalent behavior of true positive rate that is approximately 0.95. Besides,
the false positive percentage in the third stage is reduced to zero as likened with the first and second
stage. The multiple stages simplify the clone detection application in terms of true positive. In relation
to clone threats, it can be observed that a multilevel clone revealing is additionally proficient and
competent. Moreover, the multi-level clone detection also confirms the minimum rate of false positive
and negative. In the figure, it can be observed that a fewer percentage of 0.1% is for false negative.
The cause of this outcome is that there is a probability that the CH does not encounter again
through mobile node first stage of clone detection, which will increase the rate for false negative.
Moreover, due to the mobility features in nodes, in the detection period, there is the risk that some
may travel outer side of the specific area (i.e., cluster). Since the clone exists later than the real mobile
node, it is obvious that the battery level of the clone must be higher than the genuine mobile node.
Additionally, in the least time interval, the DT can identify the clone or fake mobile node in the
exact cluster area. In this way, an attacker cannot take advantage of spreading clones in MWSN.
The execution outcomes display that the DT technique is fast, competent, secure and intelligent for
clone detection. A comparison with existing (centralized and distributed) approaches is discussed in
Section 4. The DT approach is restricted with static battery types for mobile nodes. In the situation
of rechargeable battery or solar cells, the clone recognition may be very tough and challenging with
respect to their battery level.
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Figure 6. Different stages of clone detection in MWSN.
5.2.2. Communication Overhead
The total number of messages forwarded via mobile nodes in MWSN is described as Communication
overhead. If mobile nodes (i.e., N) are receiving and delivering the data via messages and every single
message must transfer by CH, 1 × N would be the overall communication overhead in MWSN. For the
proposed DT approach, it is O(N). Figure 7 screens that the overhead used for the proposed DT
approach is lesser than that of other approaches. This is because the danger theory concept is built on
cluster or cloud and every single mobile node must transfer the data to CH. Besides, O(N) depends
upon the entirely used mobile nodes with direct proportion. Hence, if there is a rise in the quantity
of mobile nodes, then communication overhead would also be increased. The result shows that the
first level and second level of detection communication overhead increases with the number of mobile
nodes. However, third level detection does not show salient changes because its task is to only forward
the message about replica to the other BSs.
Figure 7. Communication overhead of Danger Theory (DT) approach.
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5.2.3. Memory Overhead
Message storing expresses the whole messages consumed in MWSN for replication attacks.
In Figure 8, it can be noticed that the proposed method has a maximum number of messages stored.
In execution outcome, the third stage of clone detection presents a maximum storage which is 10%
and 20% compared to the second and first stage. It should be noted that the message storing reflected
in the third level detection is the sum of both first and second stage respectively. Therefore, the third
stage has a maximum number of messages stored. Each mobile node must save the data, verify it,
make a contrast that is based on similar identity. Thus, for the clone identification process, every single
mobile node must consume mobile node memory to encounter and save the packets that is based on
ID, key, location, exchange on random number, etc. The CH requires to store simply one message per
mobile node, and for this reason, only N messages are required to be stored at cluster head.
Figure 8. Message storing of DT approach.
Every CH stores the information of all communicating (i.e., N) nodes, and every CH has an
individual queue of the same dimension. Hence, the memory overhead for battery level check can be
defined as O(N) and random number based is O(1) (i.e., 1 represents the fixed number of counts) as
mentioned earlier, therefore the estimated memory overhead O(N) is for DT approach. Figure 9 and
10 explain the encounter information (i.e., sent or received messages) for every single node. Hence,
results (i.e., first stage, second stage and third stage) show that the average number of messages sent
and received increased as the quantity of mobile nodes increased.
Figure 9. Average amount of messages transmitted per mobile node.
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Figure 10. Average amount of messages delivered per mobile node.
5.3. Energy
For clone detection using the DT approach, another important factor is energy as an advisory
needs high power to control and monitor the MWSN.
Correspondingly, to accomplish a better performance for clone detection in MWSN, the energy
level must also be considered. Figure 11 displays the level of energy consumed by using DT concept at
multiple phases of detection. It shows that the energy consumption values at first, second and third
level detection among 80 mobile nodes are similar. It is also observed that by utilizing fixed batteries
types, the third level detection consumes more energy than the first and second level detection.
Figure 11. Energy consumption at different stages of the DT method.
5.4. Network Lifetime
The DT method also illustrates the multilevel (i.e., first stage, second stage and third level stage)
performance term of network lifetime. It is a time period when mobile nodes are deployed till the first
mobile nodes die because of the usage of battery. In the MWSN, the amount of the mobile nodes is
enhanced and varied between 50, 100, 150 and 200. Figure 12 explains that the network lifetime is
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stable for 50 nodes. However, as the number of the mobile nodes increases, the lifetime of network
decreases due to the usage of fixed batteries.
Figure 12. Lifetime of nodes.
5.5. Detection Time at Different Levels of DT Approach
Figure 13 characterizes the stabilized recognition time of clone threats in network at multilevel detection.
Based on the experimental results, we noticed that the detection period of the first stage depends
upon the lambda (i.e., frequency of node meeting). Besides, detection time will be increased if they
do not encounter another time. The second stage clone detection interval is smaller than the first
one because it depends upon the battery level or random number check as mentioned in Section 3.
Meanwhile, the third detection stage contains the least period as only depends on exchanging the clone
messages based on identity and key, then broadcasting the information. The fluctuation in Figure 13
shows the different detection intervals in MWSN (i.e., the nodes are mobile and clone detection is
dependent on the nodes meet each other).
Figure 13. Detection time.
5.6. Delay Impact on Detection Efficiency
The crucial task is to control the time in terms of clone detection delay in the proposed multi-stage
detection method. Parameter “d” (i.e., time out phase for receiving message) involves checking the
delay in clone detection.
As presented in Figure 14, a massive amount of clone mobile nodes is placed in networks, therefore
the rise in the value of d will disturb the performance of the mobile nodes because of time delay. Results
show that both are directly proportional to each other. Hence, detection delay will increase with rising
the factor “d” significantly. The mentioned situation should be sorted out with utilizing the suitable
clustering approach or by neglecting the nodes that move outside during the detection period.
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Figure 14. Delay effect of DT approach on detection performance.
6. Comparison and Discussion
Simulation experiments have been performed to compare the proposed DT based method with
SPRT [4,5] (centralized) and XED [30] (distributed). The effectiveness of the existing clone detection
approaches, e.g., SPRT and XED depend upon fast detection and simple remember and challenge
response (i.e., based on random number), respectively. Therefore, it motivates this research to compare
the proposed DT approach with SPRT and XED in order to show the efficiency (i.e., clone detection
improvement) to secure the MWSN from malicious activities.
The fair comparison is performed by using the same estimation, simulation parameters and
network settings. Previous research [31] has compared SPRT (i.e., centralized method) and XED (i.e.,
distributed method) by using specific simulation parameters. Therefore, this paper has used the same
consideration and estimation to perform a fair comparison between SPRT (i.e., centralized method),
XED (i.e., distributed method) and hybrid (i.e., DT) approaches. The comparison is made consuming
several execution factors, namely, replica detection ratio, completion time for clone identification,
energy consumption, false negative and false positive for replication threats. The details of the
parameters can be described as follows:
1. Energy Consumption for DT (Ed): This is the total consumption cost in support to communication
and computation overhead for clone detection.
2. Clone detection ratio (Pd): This is the ratio of successful clone identification interval over the
whole experiments’ execution.
3. Completion time for detecting a clone (Td): This is the interval that is consumed when the first
clone detection happens.
4. Errors for False Positive: This indicates the wrongly detected replicas in MWSN (a normal node
is detected as a replica).
5. Error for False Negative: This reflects that clone mobile node is not identified as a clone, which may
collapse and affect the capability and performance of clone detection due to wrong identification.
These parameters will briefly reflect how centralized and distributed methods for clone identification is
effective and more efficient in network. The single point of failure is the main concern in the centralized
approach as mentioned in [32] that affects the tasks in MWSN. Moreover, the mobile nodes deployed
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close to the base station could suffer from the huge load which would eventually lead to congestion
(i.e., load balancing issue). That could be in favor of an advisory. Therefore, for clone identification,
a balanced and distributed technique is obligatory to overcome the drawback of the single point
of failure.
For clone identification with distributed method, as observed in [30], it mostly has issues with
memory, for example XED if mobile node memory is fully occupied, for localization and detection time
completion. On the other hand, it has less load and output shows that it has least errors in terms of false
negative and positive. In order to decrease the matter of memory, hybrid method (i.e., centralized and
distributed) is used for clone identification and mitigation. By mean of fair comparison, we utilized
the same simulation parameters approximation as mentioned in [31]. Accordingly, the performance
evaluation involves 200 mobile nodes, network size of 500 m × 500 m, transmission range of 100 m,
detection time of 1000 seconds and average simulation results of 100 simulation experiments.
Figures 15 and 16 illustrate the false detection errors of the clone detection methods in terms of
false negative and false positive, respectively. It could be seen that the multi-level DT based clone
identification approach offers efficient outcome compared to XED and SPRT methods. Specifically,
Figure 15 illustrates that the proposed DT method and SPRT consume similar false positive rate which
improves the replica recognition competence compared to the distributed method (i.e., XED), However,
Figure 16 shows that the proposed DT method has a good performance in terms of false negative rates
of XED and SPRT.
Figure 15. Comparison of simulated value of false positive rate of the DT (hybrid) detection with SPRT
and XED.
The false positive and false negative values which are shown in Figures 15 and 16, respectively,
highlight the performance among distributed (i.e., XED), centralized (i.e., SPRT) and hybrid (i.e., DT)
approaches. Moreover, the calculated average values of the false positive and negative rates for these
approaches (i.e., XED, SPRT and DT) are compared based on wrongly replica detection (i.e., false
positive rate) and in the situation where replica is still present after performing the detection procedure
(i.e., false negative rate). It should be noted that by using the DT approach, there is a false positive rate
enhancement compared to XED and SPRT. Figure 15 demonstrates that the performance of the DT and
SPRT is same in terms of false positive rate (i.e., clone wrongly detected).
Sensors 2020, 20, 2283 19 of 23
Figure 16. Comparison of simulated value of false negative rate of the DT (hybrid) detection with SPRT
and XED.
Figure 16 illustrates that the proposed DT approach performance increased in terms of false
negative rate compared to XED and SPRT. The results show that the proposed method based on danger
theory is efficient, competent and sheltered for clone identification. Generally, as specified in the above
figures, it can be concluded that the hybrid, centralized and distributed techniques for clone recognition
have a positive impact in terms of false negative. The multi-level method depends on the first stage
(identify the infected area), the second stage (battery level check and exchange random number) and
the third stage (to secure network).
Figure 17 represents the contrast with respect to energy consumption in distributed, centralized
and hybrid approaches for clone recognition. XED and DT utilize less energy while SPRT entails higher.
The clone detection of the proposed DT and SPRT procedures decrease gradually, whereas the XED
method decreases rapidly for the reason of detection errors in terms of false positive and negative.
The energy consumption (i.e., Ed), replica detection ratio (i.e., Pd) and detection time (i.e., Td) of XED,
SPRT and DT approaches are tabulated in Table 1. There is a significant improvement for the DT approach
as presented in Figure 17 in comparison with the other methods for replication attacks detection.
The SPRT strategy is centralized and may suffer from only one designation collapse (i.e., BS). With this
breakdown, the whole network could be affected. Moreover, it has the issues of energy consumption
decline and absence in MWSN across one point such as BS. In addition, the SPRT approach is a fast
clone detection but it is created by comparing the speed level of each mobile node through adjusted
threshold value, hence, it needs precise measurement equipment that could be costly and unaffordable.
Furthermore, in the case of intelligent attackers, he/she could adjust the speed level (i.e., which lies in
the range of the threshold). The distributed methods can be considered in MWSN to reduce the chance
of one-point failure. By studying numerous distributed approaches, it could be observed that most
methods depend on the frequency of mobile nodes meeting at a precise time interval. Encountering
the random number-based method (i.e., XED), is not considered as a fast clone detection because it
depends on the time or frequency of the mobile node meeting. Hence, if two or multiple mobile nodes
do not encounter each other at a specific time, it will generate ample delay for clone detection. In the
paper [30], clones are not cooperative and do not meet with other mobile nodes, thus clone with no
trouble can establish secret communication, so it causes the clone recognition to fail.
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Figure 17. Comparison in terms of energy consumption.
Table 1. Node replication attacks performance comparison considering distributed, centralized and
hybrid approaches.
# of XED SPRT DT
Mobile Nodes Ed Pd Td Ed Pd Td Ed Pd Td
20 0.20 1.00 29.740 0.20 1.00 69.610 0.20 1.00 29.740
40 0.30 1.00 45.680 0.40 0.94 117.65 0.45 0.94 30.340
60 0.55 1.00 45.420 0.70 0.92 129.44 0.65 0.98 50.682
80 1.40 0.38 655.29 1.45 0.92 149.91 1.50 0.96 88.79
100 1.77 0.06 950.93 1.50 0.94 106.96 2.10 0.95 107.50
120 1.95 0.08 953.24 2.20 0.94 108.04 2.20 0.95 145.78
140 1.93 0.04 940.30 3.00 0.90 150.92 2.50 0.90 175.43
160 2.20 0.02 988.79 3.95 0.86 192.27 2.70 0.87 198.23
180 2.50 0.00 1000.0 5.30 0.82 232.52 3.00 0.87 220.40
200 2.65 0.04 959.34 6.80 0.78 272.15 3.50 0.85 265.71
Entire solutions for clone detection could come up through distinctive evaluation, inspiration and
procedures. Every single method has few merits and demerits aspects. With this basis, it cannot be
stated which method is more efficient. Secure communication is a key problem with respect to clone
detection. Furthermore, determining clone mobile node scenario obliges quick identification as an
advisory could effortlessly compromise, control or screen the MWSN, and later can practice stealing
the information. Since clone behaves autonomously and competently in MWSN, there is a chance
to encounter several mobile nodes till other loops for detection are initiated and during this period,
they can easily capture data like ID, key, secret confidential and so on. Few features can be organized
or modified with less effort, for example, with authentication [33–35] techniques, false information
can be thrown into the network. In MWSN, it is very challenging and motivating to consider about
secure environments, considerations and performances for clone threats because of mobility features.
To set up an environment with unattended hostile nature is considered very threating and vulnerable,
specifically for physical threats identical to clone attacks. Hence, an attacker could generate numerous
clones of mobile nodes with identical features. If the clone node is not identified quickly, the whole
network will be compromised by an attacker easily and could involve different kinds of threats like
screen networks, immoral data aggregation, jam the signals, misuse the data, incorrect data insertion
and so on. Thus, clone identification is mandatory and requires abolishing the clone mobile nodes.
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7. Conclusions
The proposed work projected a DT (Danger Theory) idea for clone detection at different stages.
The DT approach basically depends on a multilevel of detection: First stage (which point out the
infected cluster (DZ) via examining the frequency of mobile node meeting), second stage (battery level
check or random number exchange) then the third stage 3rd (inform about clone to other networks).
To show the better performance in clone detection, different factors, specially the true and false positive
rate, are deliberated to expose the detection features of the DT approach. It is determined through
experiments that the proposed technique attains particularly high true positive, approximately 90%,
and less false positive rate. To effectively and competently show the brilliant features of the proposed
multilevel method, and to validate the results, the method for clone detection is presented through
performing a comparison by assuming the same environment and parameter with existing centralized
and distributed methods.
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